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17 Φεβ 2014
WIKILEAKS: Το κάθαρμα ο "πυρομανής",φιλότουρκος Bryza, είχε μυστικές συναντήσεις με τουρκοκύπριους για να τους καθοδηγήσει στην νομική μάχη κατά του Τάσσου Παπαδόπουλου!
ΕΠΙΟΡΚΟΙ ΚΑΙ ΑΠΑΤΕΩΝΕΣ ΟΣΟΙ ΣΤΗΡΙΞΟΥΝ ΤΟ ΝΕΟ “ΑΝΑΝ”!
ΚΑΙ ΤΑ ΕΛΛΗΝΟΦΩΝΑ ΤΕΜΠΕΛΧΑΝΕΙΑ ΔΕΝ ΕΧΟΥΝ ΚΑΝΕΙ ΟΥΤΕ ΜΙΑ ΠΑΡΑΣΤΑΣΗ
ΔΙΑΜΑΡΤΥΡΙΑΣ ΚΑΤΑ ΤΟΥ ΤΟΥΡΚΟΥ ΠΡΑΚΤΟΡΑ ΠΟΥ ΕΠΗΡΕΑΖΕΙ ΤΗΝ ΑΜΕΡΙΚΑΝΙΚΗ
ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΗ ΚΑΤΑ ΤΗΣ ΕΛΛΑΔΑΣ!
Προφανώς κάποιοι μοιράζονται τους ίδιους χορηγούς!
Δείτε ολόκληρο το τηλεγράφημα και την χυδαία στάση του Μπράιζα.
1. (C) Summary: In a 75-minute meeting with EUR DAS Matt Bryza September
11, Turkish MFA D/US (U/S equivalent) and GOT Cyprus pointman Ertugrul
Apakan animatedly described the latest state of play from Ankara’s point
of view. Apakan stressed Turkey’s preference for a comprehensive, UN-based
settlement, explained its discomfort with “mini-packages”, but stressed
that the Turks are studying closely the recent Finnish proposal and
“aren’t saying no.” Apakan and Bryza discussed the possibility of
exploring legal challenges to the European Court’s 1995 decision against
issuing EU certificates of origin for Turkish Cypriot-produced goods as a
way to open up trade to northern Cyprus. According to Apakan, Turkish
Cypriot leader Talat is prepared to start technical talks immediately,
without a leaders’ meeting as a prerequisite. End summary.
2.
(C) Apakan focused on Turkey’s and Talat’s preference for a comprehensive
settlement. Rumors we hear about Turkey intervening with Talat to rein in
the Turkish Cypriots “are not true,” he stated. Talat is well aware of GOT
views but is in charge of his own negotiations; Apakan said he talks with
the Turkish Cypriot leader only at critical junctures. Right now, both
Turkey and Talat want talks to start without a prior meeting between Talat
and Papadopoulos, which the GOT views as key to preventing the derailment
of Turkey’s EU membership ambitions. It is easier to work within the
context of an overall settlement, which allows for trade-offs — security
for the TCs, for example, and property for the GCs — than with small
packages. Apakan referenced the Annan Plan and the way in which friends of
the UNSYG had contributed a balance of issues, all of which fit
symmetrically into the general matrix.
3. (C) Papadopoulos,
Apakan stated, says the time is not ripe to re-engage on comprehensive
settlement issues; for Turkey and the TCs, each and every time is ripe.
There should be a leaders’ meetings to set a framework, and ensure that
both technical committee meetings and substantive working group meetings
follow a specific timeline. In July, the GOT had encouraged both Gambari
and Talat. In the interim, all that had emerged were papers. Talat and
Papadopoulos simply need to announce a start and reiterate that the
ultimate objective is a comprehensive settlement. The process gains
legitimacy through gaining the imprimatur of the two leaders. Talat
remains Papadopoulos’ appropriate counterpart.
4. (C) Apakan
made it clear that Turkey has its eye on the EU progress report which is
slated to come out October 24 but may slip. In that regard, they are
looking hard at the Finnish proposal, which contains some elements that
would not make the Turks happy. Apakan stressed, however, that Ankara
would not say no, would study it, view at it as a point of departure, and
would be willing to discuss the details. He reiterated the importance of
direct trade, opening Ercan airport — even for charter flights, which
would help the tourist industry — and ending the isolation of the TCs. So
far they had seen nothing on paper; the ideas had been delivered orally.
He noted Ankara’s difficulty in deviating from its focus on a
comprehensive settlement. The challenge of mini-packages, he explained, is
that they usually do not provide enough room for maneuver for
substitutions and balances.
5. (C) Examining the run-up to the
Republic of Cyprus’ May 2004 EU accession, Apakan focused on legal
obligations he believed the GoC had undertaken. Under the Treaty of
Accession, the GOC had a responsibility to work toward a comprehensive
settlement once it became an EU member. This was, he stated, also referred
to in December 2002 EU Summit conclusions. He cited Protocol 10 to the
effect that the entrance of the GC side into the EU would not damage the
TC side, and maintained the GCs had undertaken obligations not to create
discrimination against the TCs in terms of economic development. The
spirit of the statements was clear, Apakan stated.
6. (C)
Protocol 10 has been forgotten, Apakan lamented. Protocol 3, which the UK
Government concluded, states that the Treaty of Establishment prevails:
Greece, Turkey, the UK and the two sides on the island gave birth to the
RoC. As a result, any settlement that replaces the 1960 “birth” should
emanate from those five parties. Bryza noted that in the most recent UNSC
UNFICYP renewal debate, the Greeks had attempted to change the language
from “sides” to “communities”. The USG would not agree to that because it
would undermine the Treaty of Guarantee, the second of three founding
treaties (the third is the Treaty of Alliance). Bryza recounted how he
told the Greek Ambassador to the ANKARA 00005436 002 OF 003 United States
that if Nicosia or Athens wished to renegotiate or nullify the Treaty of
Guarantee, they should say so and pursue tis goal through direct
negotiations.
7. (C) Papadopoulos, Bryza noted, is an exacting
contracts lawyer. He agreed that the GC President’s legalistic arguments
run counter to the spirit of the documents. Bryza also focused on the 1995
decision to suspend the issuance of certificates of origin. (Note: Cyprus
DDG Bilman later told us that, since the 2004 referendum, the EU accepts
documents issued by the Turkish Cypriot Chamber of Commerce. End note.)
Apakan added that the 1995 decision did not speak to the embargo — it
focused solely on the stamp on the certificate of origin and
phyto-sanitary document. Nothing in the RoC’s EU accession should empower
them to enhance their power over the TCs, Apakan concluded. That was the
purpose of Protocol 10.
8. (C) Bryza explained that during his
meeting with D/UNSYG Gambari the previous week, Gambari had reiterated
that the main goal was a comprehensive settlement. That meshed with USG
policy. Gambari had requested that Talat be encouraged to proceed with
technical talks (or simultaneously with substantive talks) even before a
meeting between the island’s two leaders, because Gambari believed he
could convince UNSYG Annan to appoint a new DeSoto if/if technical talks
are ongoing. A USG goal, Bryza continued, was to get some comprehensive
process moving now to help give Turkey some cover in October with the EU.
9. (C) Apakan responded that there was no need to encourage
Talat, who remains intent on moving ahead. The GCs say that the technical
talks must proceed concurrently with the substantive working groups and
that everything should be studied indefinitely. According to Apakan,
Papadopoulos’ list was organized not according to any UN principles, but
more in line with EU harmonization. To his knowledge, an initial meeting
between Talat and Papadopoulos was not a precondition to starting other
talks. Talat merely says that it would be preferable, but not necessary,
to have a leaders’ meeting first. Bryza said he would take that message
back to Gambari to try to bridge the communications gap.
10.
(C) Bryza explained that he had been examining legal angles, and believed
there were arguments to be made in a European court to the effect that no
binding legal decision states that shipping to Famagusta port is illegal.
Apakan interjected that all embargoes date from 1963-64 and constituted a
unilateral action by the GCs; there was no EU or UN decision. UNSCRs 540
and 541 refer to the recognition issue but not to an embargo. Apakan added
that, as the GOT had been assured repeatedly by a number of EU governments
in the attempt to get Turkey to open its ports and airports to the GOC,
lifting the embargo would not constitute recognition. “We’re not focused
on getting the “TRNC” recognition,” Apakan stated, “We’re seeking a
settlement.”
11. (C) Adding two additional points, Apakan
professed innocence with respect to Talat’s presentation of the winner’s
cup at the Istanbul Formula One race. Neither the GOT nor Talat knew in
advance, he claimed. It was not an attempt to gain political benefit. On
Lebanon and UNIFIL, Apakan made the point that Turkey did not want to see
the RoC gain political or legal bonuses as a forward mounting base for
UNIFIL. Turkey understood UNFICYP would play a support role, but wanted to
ensure that this was not exploited.
12. (C) On the Finnish
package, Bryza made clear the United States was trying to assist the EU
effort. Everyone knows Famagusta-Varosha will re-surface, despite the
Turkish side having rejected the proposal in 2004. We recognize that for
Turkey, an eventual Varosha handover to the GCs must be part of a final
settlement. We would support the Finnish effort not by offering
alternative packages, but by trying to think of a small number of
additional elements that might plus the package up sufficiently to make it
acceptable to all sides. We know Ercan is important to the TCs; property
is important to the GCs. One possibility would be to consider a form of
moratorium on development of certain properties in the north. Apakan
cautioned that the TCs would view a property “moratorium” as an additional
embargo, then noted that perhaps something could be arranged with the new
property adjudication regime in the north: during the period when cases
are under Commission scrutiny, nothing can happen to them. Bryza proposed
exploring with the Finns later this month the possibility of add-ons if
their current package proves too small and gets stuck, as Bryza suspects
will be the case. Apakan agreed. “We can’t commit to a package,” Apakan
stated, “We don’t have the authority, but we want and need to be
positive.” He added that “in some ways, your ANKARA 00005436 003 OF 003
mini-package relects the Turkish approach better than our curent official
position” but concluded that at this stage of negotiations, Turkey would
first focus on studying the Finnish proposal.
13. (C) Apakan
phoned us the following day to propose that, if Bryza will be in New York
during UNGA, that they continue their discussions there. 14. (U) DAS Bryza
has cleared this message.
ΝΑ ΚΑΤΑΛΑΒΟΥΝ ΕΠΙΤΕΛΟΥΣ ΟΙ ΕΛΛΗΝΕΣ ΠΟΙΟΙ ΕΙΝΑΙ ΟΙ ΑΙΩΝΙΟΙ ΕΧΘΡΟΙ.....
ΚΑΙ ΝΑ ΞΥΠΝΗΣΟΥΝ!
Πολλές φορές το ΕΥΧΑΡΙΣΤΩ, δεν είναι αρκετό σε κάποιους αναγνώστες, που
με τις γνώσεις ή τις έρευνές τους, μου εμπιστεύονται σημαντικά στοιχεία
που ρίχνουν τις μάσκες όσων επιβουλεύονται την Πατρίδα μας.
Δεν έχω όμως άλλο τρόπο να τους εκφράσω την εκτίμησή μου στη πολύτιμη
βοήθεια που προσφέρουν.
Στο γράμμα Β βλέπουμε καθαρά το όνομα του Ελεεινού ΠΡΟΔΟΤΗ ...
Mathew Bryza,ΤΡΙΤΟ από το τέλος... (στο αντίστοιχο ελληνικό βερσιόν "Εβραίοι της Αμερικής" δεν υπάρχουν ΟΥΤΕ
ΤΑ ΜΙΣΑ ΟΝΟΜΑΤΑ, ουτε του ΒΡΥΖΑ φυσικά!
ΔΕΝ ΘΕΛΟΥΝ ΝΑ ΞΕΡΟΥΜΕ εμείς οι Έλληνες ΠΟΙΟΙ ΕΙΝΑΙ ΕΒΡΑΙΟΙ
ΔΙΕΘΝΩΣ.... μας θέλουν ΚΟΙΜΙΣΜΕΝΟΥΣ!!!!!)
ΜΑΚΑΡΙ ΟΛΟΙ ΟΙ ΕΛΛΗΝΕΣ να δουν τι ΠΡΑΓΜΑΤΙΚΑ είναι αυτός ο "κύριος" ένας
ΑΚΟΜΑ στρατευμένος Εργάτης του ΔΙΕΘΝΟΥΣ ΣΙΩΝΙΣΜΟΥ ...
ΟΙ ΙΟΥΔΕΣ είναι ΠΑΝΤΑ ΙΟΥΔΑΙΟΙ !!!
ΝΑ ΚΑΤΑΛΑΒΟΥΝ ΕΠΙΤΕΛΟΥΣ ΟΙ ΕΛΛΗΝΕΣ ΠΟΙΟΙ ΕΙΝΑΙ ΟΙ ΑΙΩΝΙΟΙ ΕΧΘΡΟΙ..... ΚΑΙ
ΝΑ ΞΥΠΝΗΣΟΥΝ!
Πολωνο-ΕΒΡΑΙΟΣ Χαζάρος ο Mathew Bryza !!! Mε αποδείξεις!
ΕΣΤΕΙΛΑΝ ΣΤΟΝ ΤΑΦΟ ΤΟΝ ΗΡΩΑ ΤΑΣΣΟ ΠΑΠΑΔΟΠΟΥΛΟ, για να "αλωνίζουν"
ΑΝΕΝΟΧΛΗΤΟΙ στην Κύπρο μας....
ΕΠΙΟΡΚΟΙ ΚΑΙ ΑΠΑΤΕΩΝΕΣ ΟΣΟΙ ΣΤΗΡΙΞΟΥΝ ΤΟ ΝΕΟ “ΑΝΑΝ”!
ΚΑΙ ΤΑ ΕΛΛΗΝΟΦΩΝΑ ΤΕΜΠΕΛΧΑΝΕΙΑ ΔΕΝ ΕΧΟΥΝ ΚΑΝΕΙ ΟΥΤΕ ΜΙΑ ΠΑΡΑΣΤΑΣΗ ΔΙΑΜΑΡΤΥΡΙΑΣ ΚΑΤΑ ΤΟΥ ΤΟΥΡΚΟΥ ΠΡΑΚΤΟΡΑ ΠΟΥ ΕΠΗΡΕΑΖΕΙ ΤΗΝ ΑΜΕΡΙΚΑΝΙΚΗ ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΗ ΚΑΤΑ ΤΗΣ ΕΛΛΑΔΑΣ!
